

[Tape 1, Side A] ... even if there were actual genocide taking place in Grenada, which ... people think many of us perhaps ... would have provided a strong justification for what Reagan did, sending in the Marines. In fact, states have been extremely leary in the U.N. of admitting even that as a justification for crossing borders. So-called humanitarian intervention. But this goes to the point of exhibiting an almost indifference to the -- also, states it would appear believe in and want to uphold the principle that internal affairs are to be handled by the de facto regime in that particular state to any extent. Whatever, even including genocide. Thus there are not only no formal procedures for dealing with circumstances like Pol Pot's or the Pakistani genocide in Bangladesh; but it's not, in fact, as anomalous as one might think that the United States is at this moment in the position of supporting Pol Pot. Not someone like Pol Pot, but Pol Pot, as the legitimate ruler of Cambodia. Are you all aware that that is the situation the United States finds itself in at this point? And we have supported for several years the claim of the Pol Pot regime, and his representatives, Pol Pot himself being in the vicinity of Cambodia, to hold a seat in the U.N. What leads us to that has to do with the Chinese condemnation -- Chinese support for Pol Pot, which is an interesting phenomenon in itself, and then the Chinese condemnation of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which is why they support Pol Pot at all, the Chinese; namely, they're oppositional to the Vietnamese. And in turn, our concern for our relations with China, and our opposition for the

Soviet Union, thus our continued hostility to the Vietnamese regime which is allied to the Soviet Union -- obviously we have other roots for that hostility, as well -- but the shift toward China and away from the Soviet Union was critical in _____ toward an all-out code of condemnation of Vietnamese acts which puts us in this noteworthy position of supporting Pol Pot. And it sounds like a sick joke. It does follow, of course, that if you support Pol Pot, you can support anybody. Doesn't that follow? In other words, as a precedent that's not just a measure or way of stigmatizing the regime, it's a measurement. It's a check point and it's a precedent. And it means, then, that the United States government is capable under these various circumstances and for reasons of this degree of weight, which isn't very great, as a matter of fact, of legitimizing and supporting any amount of genocide. There's an article that I would like to pass out, but I didn't have it at the moment when I was copying this stuff, by Erich Fromm. I think the first sentence begins to this effect. Fromm is very interested in the Genesis story, has written on it a number of times, and on this occasion, referring to the Garden of Eden, he starts by saying, "Humanity began with an act of disobedience" referring to an act by a female, as it happens, by Eve's act of disobedience, as removing us from the idyllic but, I suppose he would say, pre-human state of living in the Garden of Eden, to civilization. Indeed, there's lots of reasons for thinking that the Eden story and the Genesis story refers to an expulsion from Eden which corresponds to the shift from the Neolithic Period to

-- not to humanity, but to something we often carelessly identify with humanity. Civilization, meaning cities largely, the world of cities, the world of field agriculture, the world of agricultural surplus sufficient to support a class society, a stratified urban society with kings and priests and armies and thus imperialism and slaves. And we know from archeological remains sexism, shown by the condition of women's burials as opposed to the indistinction from the earlier period. And racism, slavery -- same kinds of evidence. This is the package, as I've mentioned before, that Stanley Diamond refers to as civilization, the package of slavery, imperialism, racism, sexism, and whatnot, which is, in fact, identified with at the same time that the fall into intensive agriculture and cities. Okay. This begins, then, in the myth with an act of woman's disobedience, but the sentence goes on and it seems likely to be ended by an act of obedience.

COMMENT: Or saved by female disobedience.

DE: If not saved by women's recovery of the memory of disobedience. That could be.

The background -- and some of you have heard this in the first lecture, but let me repeat it briefly, especially for those who have come in, and good to review it anyway, in the context of this course, as I see it. The concern that leads to the nature of this choice in my own mind is a concern that humanity is leaning toward, is evolving toward a catastrophic

rupture, toward self-extinction or annihilation of what is often called humanity as we know it, which does correspond pretty closely to civilization as I've just described, the world of cities, a society of cities. And that this, if it doesn't come for ecological reasons is, I think, rather likely to come from nuclear war. And in turn -- this is a somewhat less common perception -- I see from my own background as a war planner and my own studies of this subject, the risks of nuclear war as being larger than would be suggested if the only dangers of nuclear war came from the possibility of accident or a gross miscalculation of some sort or a malfunctioning of a low-level, a mechanical system, or unauthorized action by subordinates, as indicated in the papers that I handed out. You all got those, or not everybody that was here the first time. I handed out a lot of papers by ... the first time, which I haven't dealt with in the lectures, but which spell out some reasons why I believe that deliberate initiation of nuclear war, in implementation of threats of the kind the Presidents have made secretly in the past and are still relying on to initiate nuclear war, are an additional and even larger source of risk of nuclear war than is the possibility of some low-level or simply misunderstood, mistaken implementation plans. In other words, the plans contemplate the possible initiation of nuclear war secretly far more ways than the public has been led to know. We have, in fact, been closer to the brink of nuclear war more times than the public tends to know, and thus the possibility of a war of the kind that most of you, perhaps, will watch on television,

you know, dramatically -- what is it, next Sunday? The possibility of that actually occurring is, I think, larger, larger as a real risk than one would imagine if you think only of the possibility, which is also real, of interaction and false alarms. This, if true -- I'll add another problem to this that I've alluded to several times -- even in the nuclear sphere the problem is not only that of extinction. Indeed, the more like -- at least until I heard the new climatic analysis of Carl Sagan and others, which raises the possibility that even relatively small nuclear wars could have catastrophic climatic effects even over the whole globe, small two-sided U.S. nuclear wars. They don't imply that this would happen from a use on the level of a Hiroshima or Nagasaki or small, limited nuclear war, which is possible. But even a relatively small, and even one-sided use by either the Soviet Union or the U.S. could trigger climatic changes because of the effects of the loss of sunlight for a prolonged period. It would change the weather, change the winds, and have one effect that even when this course began was not known to people who had studied the ecological effects of war, and that is that the fallout would get into the southern hemisphere. The reason for that is that the changes in the weather, caused by changes in temperature, would change the wind patterns that I may have actually have referred to in the first lecture, which until now have been understood would keep the fallout in the hemisphere where the warheads actually exploded. With these changes in temperature and climate, it seems, these wind patterns would be changed, so there would be an exchange of

fallout from one hemisphere to the other, and the fallout would be global even though the warheads mostly exploded in one hemisphere. And aside from that radioactivity effect, the climatic effects on the production of oxygen and of plant food and the whole animal food cycle and plant food cycle, all of these interruptions could, in fact, it turns out, end all life on earth. Still, I will _____, as I would previously have said before knowing this, there remains a very large likelihood and problem of wars that are much smaller than that but nevertheless genocidal, nevertheless vastly destructive within given regions, speaking now of massacres on the order of millions and tens of millions of people being killed in very brief time, which would of course leave most people, in the hemisphere, but nevertheless would not only be murderous, but be a phenomenon that would have the strongest, most ominous spiritual, existential moral implications for the nature of the societies that undertook such destruction and came to accept it as part of civilized life. This, I think, is a very immediate possibility. That is related to the kinds of conflicts that occur in the world, including the ones that the United States itself is involved in, and that's the third aspect I was going to bring in. Increasingly in the modern world it has been noted over the last ten years or so, really for over a matter of a generation now, there has been a sharp trend toward practices of social control and of warfare that are called barbarous and uncivilized. But these have become practices associated with modern warfare. I'm speaking now not only of individual assassination, but of deliberate

massacre, not necessarily occurring in warfare, a low-technology massacre as distinct, say, from massacre by nuclear weapons or even by bombs, but massacres that occur with bullets, knives, and hands. These have been occurring on quite large scales, perhaps the largest of all since the second World War. And of course the extermination of the Jews could be called a low-technology massacre, an engineered systematic massacre that involved nothing more than effective ~~rodent~~ vermin poison, gas that was produced originally for rodents. Likewise, there have been many other massacres, but a crucial one that I've mentioned before, the killing largely by knives and some bullets, and some just by dashing brains out, of between 500,000 and 2,000,000 people associated loosely with the Communist party of Indonesia between 1965 and 1967. There have been a number like that, including, of course, Bangladesh and several others. Sabarah (sp?) and Shatila (sp?) on the one hand, My Lai on the other, of course, are also examples of this at the low end of the scale of massacre. Torture has come back, which in some sense people were hoping and believing that it had been stamped out, but the practice of torture by states is now being plotted systematically by Amnesty and found to be not only extremely widespread, but growing, in both classic forms and new modern forms. On this last aspect, an extremely disturbing aspect is to discover that the United States of America has played a rather critical role in the bringing in to power of regimes that rely upon such methods, both massacre, death squads -- there's another phenomenon I didn't mention -- and torture. That's true in Brazil, it

was true of our Saigon regime, which published statistics of the number of assassinations -- it was killing to be sure in the course of a war -- the number of assassinations of civilian people suspected of being members of the infrastructure of the Viet Cong, but people essentially killed at night in jungle roads and were not subject to very elaborate interrogation. In fact, they were not subject to anything, they were just shot for walking along a jungle trail in the middle of the night. And these figures added up to between 20,000 and 40,000 people. It could well have been more. That started in 1967, and picked up steam very much in 1968. It followed the annihilation of the Communist party and all its families and friends and a lot of other people, grudges that were settled, which happened, as I say, started in '65, '66. Did I mention this last time, on Indonesia?

COMMENT: Yes.

DE: I did, I talked about that. So I'll just mention, then, that the head of Far East CIA at that time was William Colby. I used to have lunch with him when I was in the Defense Department. I was at a, actually had a higher rank than he did although obviously not a higher function. In other words, we discussed what was going on, he would tell me what was going on to some degree around the world. He didn't tell me about Indonesia, for sure. But I think it's not a -- as I mentioned, then, I guess, last time -- Ralph McGehee, a former high CIA agent, has revealed

that this massacre was carried out under the extreme pressure and urging and arm twisting of the United States government through CIA. And that would mean through William Colby. I think that's not unrelated to the fact that Colby was then given the job, in theory having left the CIA, of being in charge of pacification in Viet Nam right after that where he carried out the Phoenix Program I've just described of 20,000 to 40,000 assassinations. He admits 20,000. The Saigon government said 40,000. He said no, it wasn't 40,000, it was 20,000. And they weren't exactly assassinations, they were killings, but not clear, to him at least, that assassination or murder would be the appropriate word. They were official acts incident to U.S. policy of some sort.

COMMENT: He was on on Tuesday night, did you see him? He was on the weekly program that CBS is doing on Viet Nam. He was defending the Phoenix Program. A lot of it that hour was about the Phoenix Program. He said they were killed in fights.

DE: Yes, that's absurd. I mean, that is really ridiculous, which I hope they brought out.

COMMENT: Well, not well enough, I don't think.

COMMENT: I don't think it was clear at all.

DE: When we're talking about these statistics -- and I knew

about that program pretty well -- we're talking about statistics, people who were killed with a weapon in hand, or something where they were capable of having a fight, were by no means included in Phoenix statistics. That was appraised the body count. That was an armed Viet Cong. The Phoenix Program had basically nothing to do with armed people. It was by definition aimed at unarmed civilian people, under cover of being civilians, but who were really not innocent at all. They were resisting United States occupation in a civilian capacity, and, of course, deserved death without trial or _____ whatever by being _____. Anyway, it was after the Phoenix Program, which was regarded, I think, as quite successful in Viet Nam ultimately, more in retrospect than at the time, because it did kill a lot of Communists as well as "innocent" people. ... obviously, you know, the Communist is guilty. It did, in fact, hurt the Communist infrastructure a great deal and, therefore, has been imitated a great deal. Brazil, which, as I mentioned last time, a place where we overthrew democracy, elected government in 1964 and put in generals, did not develop death squads on a large scale until after the success of the Phoenix Program. And that's likewise true in places where we had had a major presence for years, such as Guatemala and other places, but who developed the death squad phenomenon at the end of the '60's after the success of Indonesia, probably the largest success CIA ever had, and Phoenix. So the emergence, then, in a country of which we're taking an extreme interest, El Salvador, of widespread death squads, the phenomena of the kidnapping, the

uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the victim, which is a major part of it, the arbitrariness of it, the terrorism across the board of operation, the use of organized paramilitary, so-called, squads of retired or off duty policemen or security forces with the coordination by the Intelligence or police services of the armed forces -- very specific organizational form apparent in Brazil, in El Salvador, in Chile, and in many other countries with which they're associated -- very precise organizational form which spreads after this, I think, was a result of a lesson. I'm saying I infer, with a good deal of evidence, and I'm not alone in this, what I would not say could be proved in court at this point, for sure, that the play of torture and death squads in countries in which the U.S. is strongly involved is not a spontaneous phenomenon, it is not something that occurs outside the awareness of American officials. I believe it is coordinated, planned by CIA officials, actually, like Colby.

QUESTION: Are the people paid by and large?

DE: Oh, yeah. It's part of their job, actually.

QUESTION: Money is the principal ...

DE: No, that's not -- well, they get an income from being in the armed forces. It's mostly done by security forces people. The idea that it's done by private citizens, for instance, was

finally was -- shocked the Kissinger committee where Robert -- it didn't shock Kissinger, I can tell you -- but when D'Aubison ^{SV} came right out and for the first time, now being a high official, having been apparently the head, earlier, of the death squads in El Salvador, now being -- what is he, speaker, or something? One of the heads of the Assembly -- he said that, no, it's not done by private citizens, it's done by personnel of the various security services, and controlled by the highest security services, he said.

COMMENT: Under orders.

DE: Yeah, under orders.

QUESTION: Does there exist any narrative of people who serve on death squads? Is there anything that would parallel, say, the people who participated in My Lai?

DE: Oh. Well, we're not talking about American citizens. There's been between 40,000 and 50,000 subject to death squads, nearly all, it's admitted, by the government there, the military, in El Salvador. There has not been one conviction. In fact, I think the only people brought to trial, literally the only people brought to trial have been the suspects which we have caused to be brought to trial for the deaths of the nuns and now I think we're pressing the case of the labor advisors. You know, one or two like that that Americans took an interest

in. Those are the only trials. That is to say, there's nobody there who has been found by any procedure to have been a member of a death squad. Somebody killed 40,000 people there in a few years, but nobody has literally been identified, so far, as having been one of them. The reason D'aubison is considered to be the head is that when he was captured -- he tried to run a coup, and in the course of that he was jailed for a while and then released. And they found documents to which the U.S. Embassy had access and Robert White, the ambassador at that time, has described some of those documents and released some of the others and said that it was his conclusion that this man was, you know, insane, psychopathic killer, and what not, and was the key person in the assassination of Archbishop Romero.

QUESTION: Do you know if there exist any kind of interviews of more classical torture in Greece, say, or --

DE: Oh yeah, there are. I mentioned to you last time, I think, that there were --

QUESTION: ... the people that were institutionalized in that ...

DE: Yes, there are various -- you mean, is there a body of literature on the psychology of torture?

QUESTION: Yes, exactly.

DE: Yes. For example -- I have a number of these books, I haven't gone over them, that do involve interviews of people who took part in the torture in France, for example. And a particularly noteworthy thing is that Franz Fanon, working for the French colonial administration in Algeria, was, as a psychiatrist or psychoanalyst, involved, in part, in treating the anxiety problems of torturers, and he -- you know, getting them back to work. Well, quite literally, preventing them from having impotence problems with their wives, or their lives otherwise being disturbed by the work they were doing. And some of the descriptions of that are in an appendix to his book, the Wretched of the Earth, and a couple of his other books, I think. That's not an exaggeration, by the way. I remember that's one of the case _____ he did. So this man who was, who did lose some sleep over what he was doing -- he disliked it _____, he didn't like it. It was, of course, a job, and, you know, no jobs are perfect. It was a job. In this particular case it was bothering him, and he was there for treatment. And Fanon gave him the treatment.

I don't want to just list, then, these evils. I've done it a couple times before. The reason for emphasizing the United States' role in this -- which I'm not going to try to prove for you for those of you ... just take it as a conjecture, and something that I'm reluctantly able to believe at this point, on the basis of evidence -- is to say, precisely, even the United States, even this country with ideals that would seem to be as opposed to such practices as any large country you're going to

find, even a country whose liberal ideas are embodied in an information system as effective as ours and with a government as subject to popular control, seems to have kept these things pretty secret. That's an element of how they got done, no doubt. But has also been capable of getting them carried out, and carried out by orders of the highest level. This is another -- again, without -- if you find this quite incredible, I'm asking you, really, at this point just to take it as a hypothesis. Imagine if -- how we could explain such a phenomenon if it were true, because that's what I'm trying to do. I think it is true. A particular revelation to me came from the discovery from the Church Committee in, I think, 1977, late in my education, of the frequency of assassination attempts by the United States and the degree of involvement of that that came through by Presidents and people close to the Presidents. One question, then, that this has posed for me for a long time -- or in some cases, I say, on the Third World aspect, the torture, and the massacres and so forth, not so long a time, seven or eight years, at this point -- is, who were these guys? What kind of people order this? Another question is, what kind carry it out? How can you get it carried out? When we dealt last time with the Milgram -- Milgram is in particular looking at the question of how does it get carried out, and in a way he forces one to change the nature of the question, because it turns out that an experiment that involves torture, effectively -- it doesn't take a special kind of person to carry it out; nor does it take -- and this is what -- only an experimental

situation could make this, I think, as clear -- it doesn't take much in the way of sanctions. The situation is so stripped down in terms of incentives. It doesn't take strong punishments, it doesn't take strong threats, it doesn't take a highly charismatic leader, or a sense of national emergency. It takes almost nothing except the abstractly created authority situation which is produced. In other words, you don't, it would seem -- to carry this out it turns out you don't have to be a German, you don't have to have a Jew as a victim, you don't have to have a highly dehumanized victim, et cetera, et cetera. So that the notion, then, that there's a problem here to be explained -- you know, how did these people come to do it, has to be recast. We can then ask the question, why do people react in authority situations this way? But the question is no longer, how did these people come to do it. And that, of course, changes our whole reaction toward individual real life massacres. How could they do it at My Lai, how could they do it here and there?

The other question that Kelman addresses more (and this is where I really wanted to focus today, is, what about the people who order this? And I will say that, as I came to learn what it was that was being ordered by our Presidents --and with strong, very high-level participation, say, by Secretaries of Defense and heads of the CIA, and people at that level -- as I came to learn it, I assumed what I think Milgram assumes to this day, that he hasn't explained how the orders get set in the first place. My assumption, I am saying, was that there could not be the same kind of ordinariness to the people who were doing this.

They could not be randomly drawn, as it seems the implementers of torture can be drawn almost randomly from an army population or from a civilian population. But surely the people who order it, it seemed to me, must be different from those people, different from the norm, different from what I supposed them to be when I was working with them. And I'll say that I went through several years which has modified only in the last few months, year or so, of thinking that I must have worked for people who were entirely different from what I imagined them to be, and different from almost anybody you see going around in a suit, a coat and tie, anyway; that they were well educated, upper middle class or upper class people, who had the psychology of thugs. And who were capable of ordering annihilation, ordering torture, and contemplating it without any qualms of conscience, and they must have been then -- McNamara, Colby, people that I had eaten with and worked with -- must have had a secret side to them. Because certainly they did not let me or my colleagues understand what they were ordering. They knew better, let's say -- it's a compliment, you might say -- than to let us know these operations. But they knew them. I'll put this in these terms: When I was in Viet Nam I dealt with CIA people all the time. And several members of the team I was part of, the Lansdale team, were either past or current CIA people. One of them was a very famous, perhaps the most famous James Bond type agent in CIA, a guy named Lou Conine who had been in the French Foreign Legion, got to be a special buddy of mine, and who had been the American on doing liaison with the generals

who assassinated Diem, for example. And been involved in many such operations. ... big special forces guy. Very, very colorful type. Very lovable, funny, extremely funny, very very shrewd, not highly educated, but very shrewd, wise, intelligent guy, very good friend who clearly was psychopathic in many ways, if that term has any clinical meaning. Very easy to understand that if he were -- he, in fact, was out of a job at the moment when Howard Hunt, an old colleague of his, was being hired to neutralize me, and he admitted that he had volunteered for that job. Not understanding it was to get me, but the question then is -- I mean, he told me this, and, of course, he didn't know the job was to get me. It was to work for the White House, sounded good. Special White House agent. And he had been fired from the CIA for various reasons, one of them being dropping a flower pot on the head of another agent from the top of the CIA building in Saigon when drunk one night. He had done a number of things like that, so they had retired him. And we both knew the question didn't have to be asked. And if you were given the orders that Howard Hunt was given, basically, which at one point came to be to "incapacitate me totally," would he have done it? He was really a close buddy of mine. I had to assume knowing him as well as I did that he might not have. But he might well have. With all regret. And he had no hard feelings about what I'd done on the Pentagon Papers at all.

COMMENT: "Don't take it personally."

DE: I wouldn't have. And he wouldn't have. Well, anyway, one understands that in the CIA you have people like that. And he, as I say, he was a top person, and had great prestige in CIA, but he was, I guess, in the class, a little bit, of other people in the CIA called animals. Now, animal, it is explained, is a term you've heard about. "Oh, he's an animal" or, you know, "You don't want to deal with that guy, he's an animal." It was not an epithet, it was a technical term, almost. For the guys that you kept around who would do anything -- and I described one last time, the W. Y. Rogue, described in the Church Committee reports who was -- they were recruiting to go get Lumumba, to poison Lumumba. The man who would do anything and understand that it was all right so long as his superior told him that it was what had to be done. His conscience wouldn't bother him. What I concluded from reading the Church Committee report and I summarized in my own mind in this way: Not everybody in the U.S. government is an animal. In fact, animals are defined like W. Y. Rogue. Animals are people who will do anything to another human being that they're asked to do. And the CIA employs them. Some are contract employees; some are CI agents. Lou Conine would have been a high example of that. Okay. Not everybody's an animal, then, it seemed to me clear. Many people were kept out of the track, many people, and it's shown in the Church Committee report, did object to given assassination proposals that were put to them, or projects that they heard about, or this or that. Many other people were never allowed to hear. And this could include someone as high as the Secretary of

State. Something I learned from the Church Committee report was that, with all the training I had had in the secrecy system, and I had twelve clearances higher than top secret or different ^{from} ~~than~~ top secret, the existence of each of them being a secret unknown to the Congress, for example, which had frequently been told that there were no clearances other than top secret, secret and confidential, which was a lie. So I thought I knew something about the secrecy system, and I thought I knew what secrets practically could be kept and how long they could be kept and, you know, who could they be kept from. One learns a lot. You know, it doesn't just go by the rules. You do learn secrets that you're not supposed to know. In fact, all the time. And you get quite a complex sense of how to keep certain kinds of secrets. I would have thought that ~~it~~^{it} was impossible to carry out the assassination of General Schneider. Did I discuss this? General Schneider was the Chief of Staff of Chile, the Chilean armed forces. Pro-American, trained in the U.S., anti-Communist, very friendly to us, but who refused to destroy constitutional government after Allende had been elected, to overthrow the elections and take over the government in a coup, which is what we wanted. So we killed him. And we later killed his second in command. We first got him thrown out of the country, Carlo Pra and his wife. And eventually we got down to Pinochet, who was willing to do anything, like Ky, or various people we've finally gotten down to in Viet Nam. And I would have said you couldn't do something like that without the knowledge of the Secretary of State, meaning that I would have

assumed that somebody for career reasons, and various kinds of loyalties and reasons, would have walked into the office of Secretary of State, closed the door, or taken him out somewhere, and said, "This is something you should know. Here's what's happening." That's wrong, it's very clear. It's quite clear, as the Church Committee concluded, that Rogers was kept from knowing, as was the ambassador in Chile, Cory, from knowing about this plot involving the kidnapping, which was a euphemism for the killing of Schneider. described all this as a kidnapping: "To the surprise of the kidnappers, who were heavily armed, he reached for his pistol when he was kidnapped, and therefore had to be shot." But it's clear that that was done, because they would have objected. It was clear for lots of reasons; and they were simply cut out of the pattern. That exposed me to a degree of possibility of secrecy that I really hadn't learned in a dozen years in this system. And one other thing. The boss, through whom Lou Conine and I worked in Viet Nam, named General Lansdale, was at that time at the end of his career, and he drank a great deal, and he would keep us up, really, to often two, three, four in the morning, listening to tales, endless tales of the great old days in the CIA. He had been a CIA man. I would not have thought that I could go through -- two years ago I would have bet my life, virtually -- without learning that he had been in charge of a secret war against Cuba just before the job that I was associated with. He was head of Operation Mongoose, which Kennedy put into process after the Bay of Pigs to overthrow Cuba, and which was -- to

give you a sense of the scale of our operation, one of the people who set out, who burgled my psychoanalyst's office, later caught in the Watergate, and who was one of the eleven people brought to incapacitate me, a guy named Eugenio Martinez, who was a former, well educated accountant from Havana, who had done over three hundred separate missions into Cuba under Operation Mongoose. And it was an enormous covert operation. Lansdale was in charge of this. And one aspect of it, which is how it came out in the Church Committee, was that he had recommended and had been given the job by Kennedy of staffing out ways of assassinating Castro. I had in fact never heard a hint that he'd had anything to do with Cuba, and I'd heard a lot about his career— Or had had anything to do with assassination. And, you know, I look back on it. Some members of the team obviously knew that. I didn't. So there was just a practical matter, I realize, that some things can be very, very secret. This guy, in other words, for all my clearances and all my work with him, I had no need to know that and he didn't show anything. But that's not coincidental, what the secrecy applies to. One learns from the Church Committee that -- are reports, which I recommend looking at -- that assassination plots are, in fact, kept extremely secret. They do not involve almost any paper written down. Enormous procedures are gone through to prevent the President, who, in fact, is clearly in charge of these things, from having it pinned on him. Many, many cutouts are involved to allow the President to deny that he knows any such thing. And they happen about as frequently as first-use threats of nuclear weapons,

[Side A, Tape 2] ... what we use our secrecy system on. And they appear about as frequently, about once every couple of years, two, three or four years.

QUESTION: How do you know the frequency if there are levels of secrecy ...

DE: No, I'm saying because these are two areas, and there might be lots of others, but these are two kinds of things that have eventually, one can now plot about ten or twelve instances of them, the assassinations, due to the Church Committee report. I'll tell you, by the way, Bernstein, Rob Bernstein of Woodward and Bernstein, did a study which he couldn't get published anywhere, a very large study, except Rolling Stone, though it was a very impressive, long study, for which they paid him a lot of money. Most people have never seen this, in which he had a lot of material from the Church Committee that had not been published on the CIA's relations with reporters, such as the fact that 400 working members of the press -- not stenographers, not linotypers -- but journalists and editors and publishers have a paid contract relation with the CIA and have secrecy clearances. Four hundred. Including, he said, some of the most well known names in the business. And some of the names he gave were like publisher of the New York Times, and a number of others associated with the New York Times and the Washington Post. Okay, I mentioned this to say the CIA made a deal, however, with the Church Committee, which was investigat-

ing assassinations, that they were very forthcoming with assassination phenomena. They gave a lot of detail, more than they had to, on assassinations freely to the Church Committee.

QUESTION: When was that report, Dan?

DE: I think '77. Wait, I can tell you when. No, no, it's later, because -- I read it in '77. It came out earlier, I think '75.

They gave them that material, according to Bernstein, they gave the Church Committee that material to keep the Church Committee from publishing information on a much more sensitive topic, and that was CIA relations with universities. That's all Bernstein learned. What that could be, I don't know. But it's more sensitive than the relations with even journalists, which were in turn more sensitive than the assassination phenomena. Because the assassinations were foreigners. So there's something there which is worthy of investigation.

Now, it has been a long way to get to the gist of this following point. I concluded, then, there were more animals -- not everybody, as I say, was an animal. There were many officers, like myself, who were not trusted, who were not given information about this kind of information because they would have disapproved. The implication was I was not mistaken that I worked with a lot of people who would not have approved of this stuff, because clearly the process provides for cutting out large numbers of otherwise crucial officials on the grounds that

they could not be trusted to approve it, not be trusted not to leak it, perhaps to the Senate or to a Court. That was reassuring. But there were a lot more animals than I had realized, and they included every President of the United States. That's what I concluded. I had worked, I had to conclude, for people who were secret "animals," who were much more easily able to contemplate this kind of operation than I would have imagined they could. They were like Lou Conine, is what I'm saying.

QUESTION: Are you saying the chain of command does go to the President?

DE: That's clear, clear to me, at least, reading --

QUESTION: What do you say about the Kennedy assassination?

DE: That's complicated. But I'm talking about -- these were assassinations ordered by the President. Could such people, then, be involved in an assassination of the President? When you become aware of some of these things, that is easy to answer, and the answer is yes. The nature of the secrecy system is such that anybody can be cut out of it, and that certainly includes the President. You learn a lot -- I already knew this, of how you generate a new classification or a system such that you can bypass any given person. The kind of thing I'm talking about, by the way, when I say that Rogers was cut out or Cory

was cut out, they, in fact, cut out the CIA station _____ in Chile, because in part of his close relations, official relations with Cory, whom they didn't want to know the ambassador. So they sent a new guy down who was in no way to have any association with the CIA station, have his own communications, he was not to report to the CIA station or to the head of Latin America desk. He was to report only to a special task force in CIA itself, which consisted of a handful of men. The head of Latin America operations, for some reason never explained, was cut out of this. In short, it's illustrated a point, I was once, I may have told you this, in an office in the White House executive office building with several people including Carl Cazen, and somebody said, "I wonder how many clearances there are?" As I said, I had a dozen at that point. And Cazen said, who worked for McGeorge Bundy, both of Harvard you realize, Cazen said, "I have them all." And he worked for the President for Bundy. Now, he was new to the system. He had only arrived a couple of months earlier, and this was the kind of thing one wouldn't correct him on, if he didn't know. I'm sure the other people who were new there, I knew several of them who were much more experienced than he were, knew that that was a beginner's statement. There was no way to say that with that assurance, if you knew how the system worked. There was no possible way of knowing whether you had them all. The system is designed to keep you from knowing what clearances exist and what don't and who's on them and what not. There's no way around that. The President couldn't possibly assert I have all the clearances. That

doesn't mean anything. He couldn't know that. They're like secret languages, in effect. It's like saying I know all languages of the world. It would be a silly statement.

QUESTION: Can't they originate from all sorts of different centers, also? It's not as though it all flows from the same point. It could flow from dozens of points.

DE: Right. This, at any rate, was the unhappy thought that occurred to me, that I'd been a fool about who these guys were. I didn't know them. They were obviously brutal or had a psychopathic streak of some kind, secret streak, and that included Colby and McNamara. Oddly, I'd been studying the Church report in preparation for a debate, a very rare kind of debate with Colby, who was still head of CIA then, and he was the only head who ever accepted debates, he did a couple. And I was debating him at USC and I read this stuff, and my head was spinning from it, these conclusions. In part I could see what later proved to be pretty much the case. What happened in Chile was so close to what had happened in Indonesia that I had immediately to infer that, in fact, we had run the coup in Indonesia. The pattern was just the same. That later has turned out to be the case, but I guessed that from reading it. So in meeting Colby we were both going to go on -- this was being videotaped, he was just being made up down there, and he wanted to shake hands, hadn't seen me since the funeral of a friend of mine. And I could hardly -- it was one thing, to be

on a platform attacking him, you know, but to shake the hand of somebody that I just realized had not just run the Phoenix Operation, which I could understand in his eyes as part of a war. In fact -- now we get back to this question of precedent -- I once heard him in the other public debate be questioned, "How do you justify Phoenix," and so forth. And he said, "Well, it was a war, they were doing it too. A lot more people were being killed by bombing" which was true, more civilians were being killed by bombing. And then he said, "And after all, if it was legitimate for us to drop the atom bomb on Hiroshima" -- as I say, if this, then the others.

Well, I could understand an official having that attitude. He was well aware, as I was, he killed far fewer civilians than anybody in the Air Force bombing operation. So I could understand -- I wouldn't have singled him out then for particular butchery, actually, in my own mind. I still wouldn't, really. I see it in that perspective, as far as the Phoenix is concerned, more than I would an Air Force man. But Indonesia looked like something else. That wasn't a war, at all. They weren't shooting at us. They weren't doing it. And this was 500,000 people. That's a little different scale. So who was this guy? I had to look at him with a kind of awe. I had just read this. A man who would totally overthrow democracy in Chile, and so forth. But, you know, I didn't imagine that he'd done it on his own. And McNamara had to be over him in this respect, as part of the Thirty Committee, and, of course, the President over him, in this case Johnson.

At this point, that's not my understanding of who these guys are. I think -- I thought the problem was how to explain why these guys -- how they could be so vicious and conceal it so well. Who found them, exactly, from their Harvard classes, and their clubs, and their corporate careers, and all? How did you find guys who were really willing to do this? That was the kind of problem I saw. I don't think that's the problem any more. And Kelman is one of the influences on this, and others. Notice that Milgram's own assumption was the same, that the soldiers had conducted My Lai because they'd been ordered to, just like the people in his experiment. They were random, ordinary humans who did it because they'd been ordered. They had been ordered -- he regarded My Lai, of course, as an evil operation and imbedded in a large scale destruction, as did Kelman. The implication is, then, that it is "malevolent" authority that has done this, and that's Milgram's term. That's in accord with what I've been saying. If you read Kelman, as I had before I talked to Milgram, it leads to the question, which I put to Milgram: What if the people giving these orders are really no more out of the ordinary than the people who obey them? How could we understand that? And of course Kelman's answer is -- and one finds it elsewhere, when you look for it -- they too, though they don't have an immediate personal authority over them to give them orders, they think of themselves in very comparable ways as confronting a situation in which their responsibilities leave them no choice but to do what they did. They are obligated to do it. It is their duty. These are terms that add

up to saying that they have no responsibility for the results. Anyone in their position, with their responsibilities and their sense of the national interest would have had to do the same, is compelled by the organizational demand, by the nature of the circumstances they're facing. They had no choice. And without choice, no responsibility. Without responsibility, no guilt. It was the right thing to do under the circumstances. Even though under other circumstances they could see as well as anyone else that it would be illegal, murderous, horrible, evil, terrible. But under these circumstances, since the alternatives would be even worse in some sense, it's a lesser evil. And a lesser evil as they saw it is not an evil at all. A lesser evil is the right thing to do. I should put it this way: A lesser evil can be optimal, as we said at Rand, can be the best thing to do under the circumstances, which means that there's no operational sense of evil attached to it. Not only is it not forbidden, which is a word we associate with evil, usually, it is obligatory. It's what you should do, what you must do, being the best thing. The alternatives are worse.

QUESTION: The last several lectures you've come back to this point. What I'm experiencing, as you build to it and describe it, is the power of it. I was thinking about that. The other thing, the thing about the process that we're going through here, in the room, as this happens -- there's something that's so powerful, the imagery of ____ that has a tremendous effect here. That is, you're again and again coming back to the thing

of people going along. Kind of being scripted into an organization, kind of following orders, feeling they had no control. And I keep thinking -- there's a way in which I've started to feel, particularly because I feel like, I've heard this before. But the point is not to chastise. I think there's something about the process that it will be useful information, I hope, for what we're about here. There's a part of me, particularly after reading somebody wants to feel some personal responsibility, and I think literally in this process that is, start to feel kind of passive about the mission, that is, where we're headed, where we're headed fastest, how we can contribute to the process in the room. I don't know if I'm being

DE and others: No, you're not.

QUESTION: Okay. But there's a way -- again, the extremity of my reaction feels like the material is evoking it's hard to sit here passively and listen to how everyone's getting so passive and obedient. And there are a number of questions I have. But one is about where we're going here, and how we shape this mission as a group so that we don't replicate the kinds of processes you're talking about. That's one.

The other is simply some content questions from the material But maybe we -- I guess I'd like to address that first question, where we're headed and how this group can kind of feed in so there's more of a sense of participation from

everybody in a way we give you something that's useful, as well as

DE: Do you want to follow that up?

QUESTION: Well, there's some information -- I'd be curious about hearing where the mission, where the course goes from this point. That is, the thesis is laid out I think pretty well by you that there's a kind of ... thoughtout. Looks like everybody gets scripted into these _____. Where are you thinking of going from there. And there are questions which are very important to me, some of which got raised last time, that is, understanding what factors affect people taking the personal responsibility. That is, what enabled you to do it, what enables us to do it, what enables those we work with to do it. Those people who refused Milgram. I mean, there is all of that that in some way I want to look at. There's also simply understanding conceptually some of the factors that lead people to stay involved, you know, kind of stay in that, and I want to give one example from Paul and I driving home the other day. We were talking about whether to bring up something like what I'm bringing up right now, and feeling it last time. Paul said, "Well, maybe he's doing that on purpose."

DE: Doing what, by the way?

QUESTION: Hammering home the same point, challenging us to kind

of get disobedient and say, "Wait, how are we going to be part of this?" In a way, seeing you trying to teach or having a moral, seeing the leader as somebody who really has a good intention, who knows more than we do. I just think that is such a powerful fantasy for what maintains those systems that at least we ought to pay attention to it.

QUESTION: Secrecy is another part, because you hold a lot of secrets that we don't have. You can call it knowledge, you can call it secrecy, which I imagine must be --

QUESTION: -- but okay, it's those kinds of levels I'd like us to look at. What are the things that glue it. For me -- I think for both of us it was more the good intentions. I think the secrets is another part. You have this power, so we're --

QUESTION: Well, in the secrecy, and here's power. If you know something I don't know, you're more powerful. I don't know what it is, and I don't know how powerful you are.

DE: Okay, can I address this a little. First, I think your reactions are -- I have put myself in the position of seems a very natural reaction. And also, I know this is not -- I know I'm harping on certain kinds of phenomena. And let me, if I may -- I've been told by some people in the course, that it seems useful for me to get personal. I have misgivings about that, but they said no, it's helpful. So let me put this in the

context of a personal experience, which is the precursor of this course.

② I've had for a long time -- I'm talking now about material which has not only been puzzling to me and which I do think I am beginning to see some ways of understanding, but which I have a peculiar feeling of horror of, or tension about. They're not only things that were -- I know they're not known as facts, of course as phenomena, in terms of what our complicity in various things, U.S. complicity, and what we have done and in what human -- certain kinds of human dangers we face are certainly not well known. So one of my problems in trying to understand this is the strong feeling that this -- if people are going to help me understand it, they first have to be brought into the universe of discourse, they have to be told what some of the risks are, what the dangers are, what the phenomena which -- it's not as though we can say, "Well, we all know that nuclear weapons are a danger; we don't have to discuss that." That's kind of a commonplace understanding these days. But that there is a danger that the U.S. President might initiate a nuclear war, that's a different matter. People are not aware of that. Even experts aren't. So I had this feeling -- first, I want people to help me on this, understanding this. It's a hope I have for the course, to help me understand it. But I have had this feeling, as I say, that first they've got to know what the problem is to some extent before And I'm not just talking about this course, but in my relations with lecture audiences to a large extent, which are not, as you suggest, that satisfying to

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me. I don't in the end get that much back, or even personally, because I'm in the position of feeling that I have to tell them this and this and this first, so they'll know what the problem is.


But it goes beyond that. There is an insistence -- the way I tell it -- I've been told this, and I can understand it -- has maybe a peculiar quality to it, which -- one aspect of which is repetitiveness, probably. It reflects a feeling I have consciously that people are going to find this very hard to believe, which may or may not be true. Obviously it depends on the politics of the people. Some people won't believe it if I give them any amount of evidence. Other people find it easy enough to believe right away and they're prepared to go on. But I pretty much act as though they just can't believe this, it's too incredible, and it's too horrible to believe. Now, part of that, of course, is my own identification with these people. Of course, it's not a perfectly obvious point, but this is their own psychiatry. It should be obvious enough to you, I suppose, that there is a peculiar tension about this material because I'm talking about people who not only hired me and were my friends, but I was with them, I was them. If I did not participate in these operations, and I didn't, what does it say about me -- I don't know entirely yet -- how hard did I work at not knowing this stuff at the time? I don't know all the answers. I certainly don't starch on the assumption I was blameless, I couldn't have found this out, and what not. So I am part of the case material here, I am part of the phenomenon

that I have to work with. Why did I know this? Why didn't I know that? So in other words, I'm implicated in this material, more than, probably, most people in the room.


COMMENT: That's sure safe to say.

DE: Well, it's not safe to say because, in a larger audience, because if you hint as an American, as I have for just expository purposes, I once said it at a war crimes conference in Washington, in Congress, I said "Looking around the table" which included Telford Taylor and Richard Croft and a number of other people --

COMMENT: Well, that's a little different.



DE: Well, he'd been a general. And I said, "You know, looking around this table discussing war crimes, I may be the only person" -- about twenty people -- "I may be the only person who is subject to be tried in a Nuremberg-type war crimes trial. So I look at this problem from a peculiar perspective. Now that was my way of suggesting that American officials had committed war crimes, but doing it without being too invidious. And I didn't at all give myself airs that I'm Albert Schweir (sp?) or McNamara, or that I'm plagued by guilt, or what not. I just wanted to say, American officials -- I know it because I've been one and I think people like I put that in the form of saying -- that was a very un-American thing to say, it turned



out in a certain sense. That statement plagued me for years and years because it kept getting quoted. Ellsberg did what he did because he is tormented by guilt, by an exaggerated sense of guilt, obviously. I mean, who was I? Which is not what I was trying to -- grandiosity, you know. In other words, to confess, for me to say Yes, I was there. Well, it might be all right for you people. You hear this stuff all the time. You can say grandiose, but that's all right. It's just a technical term. But I'm just saying, in America, to suggest this is not

Some of you -- anybody here hear Weinberger this afternoon? Okay, I was in the -- you were in the audience in the auditorium? I couldn't get in the auditorium, but Mark and I were sent over to the science building and watched him on huge screens, and heard him accused -- saying, "How can you live with your conscience" -- he was asked again and again. "How can you be an Episcopalian, a Christian? How can you live with your conscience" John asked him afterwards, not even having heard it. John Shushart (sp?) saw him afterwards. Search your conscience. But actually he was asked this eight or nine times, as I listened. He had no particular strain, I would say, dealing with that compared to other questions. And he said -- but very specifically he was asked a very good question, like what I've been saying. What about the 40,000 deaths in El Salvador that we have caused by our policy? What about the more than 50,000 dead in Guatemala? And the guy went down a list. And he just said, "But we have no complicity in any of that." And he said in each case, "My conscience is clear. I have no problem." So the

phenomenon I'm looking at -- I believe that's true, by the way, that's the phenomenon of the course, you can see here, in a way. But anyway, part of the problem, then, is, as I say, I spend more time than I probably need, perhaps, in a given group at chewing over, let's say, certain phenomena in order to make it credible that they actually happened. And I would encourage you to believe that -- this should be taken as interesting phenomena. And on the other hand, material that I have trouble digesting myself, you know, I've had trouble coming to terms with, that it ever happened, that I was part of it. Remember, when I say Indonesia, that's a period that I managed not to know about, but that's the period I was right in the heart of the government at that point. These were the people I was working with. But let me get, if I may, to the -- I want to, on the question you raise, now, of where should we go -- I said to myself last time but also this time let's do it. I do want to raise that for discussion. Let's do it before 9:30. How many have to leave at 9:30? Okay, so we're getting on. I will explain how, as I say, my thinking has changed on this very recently in the way I just described just before this happened. It actually happened -- and I think it's worth telling -- at a seminar I was giving with Ram Dass of Harvard, formerly of Harvard, Richard Alpert of Harvard, kicked out for LSD, of Alpert and Leary, as you recall. Okay. Ram Dass, who's now a Hindu or an eclectic Eastern mystic, a very smart and wise person, a very nice guy, also. We were giving this seminar for three days -- I thought of it almost as a rehearsal for this

course, to some extent, although we haven't covered all the material, and of course he was approaching everything from the point of view of the Eastern or the mystical point of view, that if anything is bad, if there's such a thing as anything bad, it's to the dualistic to have a we/they kind of paradigm. All is one. From a practical point of view that means you assume in approaching any given social problem that the other people are you. You're all -- it's all part of a unity. But also, in a lesser sense, that they're like you, that they're not unlike you, they're not different, they're not It's a recognizable point of view. He was a very coherent I felt uneasy about that because I was, as I say, consumed by this feeling that something that Americans need to know is a) not to trust their government, you know, they should be skeptical, they should not have a kind of trust that their government is taking care of them in certain ways, which means, to get to your other point of what do we do about it, we have to do it ourselves, in some sense. We've got to protect ourselves, protect our children. It's important to know. And therefore it is important to know that these people are not doing what we think they're doing, and they're doing something that must be stopped. It would be helpful in stopping it to know how it's happening, why they're doing it. And as I said, when it comes to the top layer -- I'll just use this to capsulize what I want to convey this time. I had come to the conclusion over some period that they were different from what we thought they were, and they were different from us. This is the only explanation I could come to from

0 the fact, which was incontrovertible, that they were doing things that we didn't or shouldn't want them to do. I couldn't understand it, myself, in any other way than that they somehow were different from us, just by the very fact that they were able to do and order these things. Well, this made, of course, Ram Dass very uneasy. I mean it seemed like a wrong paradigm to him. He wanted to be sympathetic to what I was saying, but he could not accept the idea. And at one point he accused me of saying that these people are of a different species from us. He said, You talk as if McNamara and these other people were a different species. You may have heard this in my voice here, maybe. And I said, that's unfair, because I had said specifically they are not of a different -- the words I had said were "these people were not of a different species. They are human. We recognize them. It's not just one person. It's not some psychopath. One thing is to understand it's a rather broad class. It's every President we've elected, and one has to assume that they are not that different from the ones who didn't win, So it's a class of people who are nominees or potential nominees. It's a rather broad class, and it's a lot of people of different personalities. And I wanted to make this point that it was not a peculiar idiosyncrasy of these guys. They had all engaged in these threats and these assassinations and these massacres. So I said, "You're wrong, I didn't say that." But I thought over what he'd said, as I will think over more as I do hear you, and I thought, now how did I say it, what was I saying that made him think that I was making that big a distinction.

And I realized there was a kind of horror in the way I described them. I had said that I have absorbed the Gandhian teaching at the beginning of my career as a peace _____, back in '69.

That one doesn't -- hates the sin, not the sinner. You distinguish between the person and what they're doing, you don't use the concept of evil people. But you do use the concept of evil -- unlike Easterners on the whole, unlike mystics -- Gandhi did use the notion of evil practices. And the distinction from thinking of them as being done by evil people is that -- to say that someone is an evil man or woman is to say they can't change, that is their essence. That is their nature in life.


They're unchangeable, they are different from you, entirely of a different nature. Unlike humans, they can't change, and this is their essence. And it also suggests that you have a right to eliminate them, which you don't. Because, as Gandhi says, you may be wrong. They may be totally reliable, what they're doing and what their role is, or what's good or bad. You don't have a right to eliminate them. But you -- and here's where he differs from most Buddhists or Hindus. Gandhi said, "But, you do have a right, and in fact an obligation, to make judgements that certain things are evil practices," which means that those people must be, if you can, nonviolently, without destroying the person, you must try to obstruct that, stop it, resist it, expose it. You must not cooperate with it. This is the meaning of evil in that sense. Something that you have an obligation to resist. It seemed to me, and I said this to his seminar, who were mostly Ram Dass followers, so they mostly came from -- with a bent

toward mysticism, so it was quite challenging to say to them, "I don't think you can dispense with the concept of evil as associated with practices," and in this operational sense that I'm describing, practices that are so bad, so destructive, so dangerous that you must block them. And to do it without killing people or harming people. Okay. Well, that didn't bother him. I saw this as a Gandhian invention in the field of mysticism. Gandhi came from a largely mystical tradition too in his own thinking. But this was an innovation that he made: A new way of being a ^{Buddhi} ~~Bodi~~ ^(sp?) ~~Satva~~. Not merely by setting an example, not merely by meditating, not merely by striving for personal enlightenment in order to bring about other peoples' enlightenment, ^{also} but ^{to} cooperate with other humans in putting your bodies in the way of evil social practices, practices which were preventing other people from enlightenment, and were bringing pain. This is not in the Buddhist tradition. And yet it has the spirit, you know, of Buddhism. Anyway. But I had to face that although I was saying there were no evil persons, I didn't really sound as though I believed that about some of these people. And, in fact, they even caught me that I couldn't keep from saying that if there ^{were} ~~was~~, (if I could believe in evil forces in the world, which I didn't, but if they existed), then I would have to perceive Edward Teller as a channel for those forces. And I had to admit there was some contradiction in what I was saying, and I couldn't retreat from that perception entirely. And this is true of some of these other people as well. Obviously Hitler. And of course the paradox that I was coming up

with whereas everybody would perceive what I was saying about Hitler, let's say, it's harder to see that about Teller, and certainly about McNamara or Jack Kennedy.

Okay. Here was the insight. "You know, I have been thinking about McNamara and other people like that as if I hadn't read Milgram. As if I didn't know that normal, natural ordinary people could, under some circumstances, do evil things. And of course -- actually, even Milgram doesn't shrink from the word evil at all, he's not a mystic. He says, they do evil things. That's the way he describes it. Now if that's true for the followers, shouldn't I -- have I really absorbed that into myself, you know, as I look at the superiors? And I think it was around that time, I forget exactly how it came about that I -- I guess I said something to this effect, and Kelman then said you should read some articles of mine. He heard me give a lecture. That's how I found the Kelman articles. I read those and thought, "My God, this is the hypothesis I've been looking for." And of course the gist of it is, finally, that what is true -- I mean, the proposition is that what's true for the followers is true for the leaders. They don't necessarily have to be much different as people from what I thought they were. And that is to say, they're not different from me and they're not different -- you know, obviously there are individual differences, but they're not, on balance, different from us, from most people. And yet they manage to do these things. Which is to say, by the way -- it's another way of putting my sense of dread -- we should not take reassurance, I'd already

concluded, from the fact that our Presidents appear to be normal people. And the answer is not that they're secretly abnormal people -- that's another hypothesis that I've been living with, you know, that they kept it from us but that they really managed to be much more brutal and tough than we imagined. But that,

 in fact, normal people in organizations, either as leaders or followers, were capable of planning, implementing, conceiving evil practices under certain circumstances which, unfortunately, do arise rather frequently, to a far greater degree than we imagine. And that must be true of ourselves if we were in those positions. If our surprise about this and the ability to be fooled by this process reflects the fact that we don't understand ourselves that well, we don't understand how we behave, would behave in those circumstances. And all of this has -- anyway, this is a model of how it comes about, which

|| [bears, then, on the question we want to turn to: What do we do about it and how do we go on studying? But if I may, then, literally -- it's now ten after -- let me take five minutes, six minutes, and run through very quickly, then, I think, some propositions that I meant to start with an hour ago. That will finish the content for this lecture. We'll go on to where do we go from here, and what do we want to talk about in this course.

|| First point, a comment on the title of the Kelman article, which is "Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers." I want to focus on the word dehumanization. It is related to a statement that he makes on pages 38 and 39 and a number of other places as

follows: Sanctioned massacres occur in an authority situation, the structure of an authority situation is such that at least for many of the participants the moral principles that generally govern human relationships do not apply. Similar statement on the preceding page. We can learn more by looking not at the motives for violence, but at the conditions under which the usual, moral inhibitions against violence become weakened. And it goes on on the next page to say, a major condition on which they become weakened is an authority situation. A situation in which somebody is recognized as having the right to tell you what you ought to do next in that situation. And in those situations, the usual moral inhibitions apply to the general -- the moral conditions that generally govern human relationships do not apply." Anybody see anything wrong with those statements? With five minutes I won't wait to answer. I'll tell you. Generally, usually. What situation are we usually in 40 hours of the week and a good deal more than that?

COMMENT: An authority situation.

DE: How often are we not in an authority situation, whether in the family, as children, at least, or in school, in a corporation, not just in the Army. In an organization of any kind. We're talking about organizational behavior. In other words, the usual moral principles apply usually, except most of the time of our waking adult lives. Isn't that what we're saying? Isn't that saying that the word usual and moral here

and general here is a misdefined term to some extent, which keeps us from observing that these are not principles that apply -- if he's right in saying they don't apply in this organizational setting -- they're not the usual principles. And if we think they are the principles, or the usual principles, we are being misled, and we're misleading ourselves and others. I think I observed this earlier point the dehumanization of victims and victimizers. He says, Kelman says, at one point, that the process is dehumanizing for a number of reasons because it involves foregoing a sense of choice, a sense of freedom, free will, a sense of responsibility, which is surely a major aspect of being human, is it not? Civilized, surely. It involves a willingness in an obedience situation to do things that are uncivilized -- kill people on command, even kill women and children on command, it turns out -- massacre. Surely unhuman behavior. And finally, it involves doing this to other humans, and thus breaking a sense of empathy with those other humans and constricting, then, one's sense of empathy and familyhood with these other people which Kelman defines plausibly as an attribute of being human. A sense of community. If you're killing people, if you're torturing them, if you're what not, you're clearly expelling them from the sense of your community and you're constricting your own community. On all these grounds, then, you are acting like a robot, a machine, and not a human, he says. Look again at the word human. If he is right, that, in fact, this is characteristic in its objective sense, organized behavior, state, community, team, organization bureaucracy,

approximation in the last 5,000 years that we call civilization, that is human experience. Situations in which you're not in that are certainly not more frequent, really not as frequent.

QUESTION: You don't include the family in your

DE: Well, I meant to say family, but in, particularly, obviously, the hierarchical aspects of the family. Not, of course, the modern marriages that we're all in. But situations where somebody in the family is a recognized authority. Especially, vis a vis, the children.

Okay, there are several things wrong, I think, with this use of the word dehumanization. Just on that last point, that by killing these other people or being prepared to torture them, you are restricting your sense of the human community, and thus you're being less human yourself, you have less of a sense of community. There -- and I put this to him, and I think he agreed -- there I think he's simply on a wrong track. He really describes the torturers or the massacres people as people who feel less human for this reason, feel less self-esteem. My own experience in any study of this suggests immediately these people tend to feel and be members of elite groups which they are extremely proud to be part of, and it so happens that the killing and the torturing is the price they pay as evidence for loyalty, and the loyalty, in turn, is the price of an extremely tight sense of community which -- maybe they are people who would pay a higher price than most for the community. But they

get -- and members of the SS, indeed, like members of the Marines or other groups you could think of, from anyone's immediate experience, far from suffering in that situation from a loneliness or sense of isolation have a very gratifying sense [end of Side A, Tape 2]

[Side B, Tape 2] [continues with student speaking] ... experienced as disloyal and bad thing to do. And as an individual or as a family is trying to change its rules, people experience, I think, about that same feeling. And there may be something interesting to learn from therapy. Therapy ...

COMMENT: That's interesting. The word may not be authority. The word may be the system in which you are that gives you a sense of being alive, that gives you a sense of having meaning, that gives you a sense of being connected. You know, that may be the key to ...

DE: Well, in what you're doing, you're responding to a hierarchical superior, an authority, but you're saying that why you do it is not necessarily related to your relation to that person, but your relation to the whole system in which you're both embedded. And your desire to remain related. And if you disobey that authority, what is the real sanction. Not what he may do to you, but that you will be expelled as a member of that group.

COMMENT: You see, that's what the government's doing to you. You have taken this incredibly courageous stand, but it's very hard to script people like us. It's the company, I think it should be done. A commitment --

You are carrying, I mean, you would be the identified patient, of course, brought in by these people, and you're the one who's taken responsibility for everybody in a system which is insane where people are not taking responsibility. But it's hard, and it seems to me in some ways that's similar to what this energy is in the early part of the course, because you're trying to bring us in in some way. And yet it's hard, because we haven't been part of that club. It would mean a lot if somebody in that club came out and you weren't alone. Now maybe there have been more others than I understand. But they are holding the boundary in a way that isolates you incredibly. And a therapist would be trying to figure, what is going on --

COMMENT: That's what happened at the table.

QUESTION: That is, in some ways that group is still answerable to you, the sons of bitches. I mean, they are. They haven't broken ranks, in a way, that leaves you under unbelievable pressure. And what the powers -- I imagine Jimmy Carter's out there knowing some things that he'd like to say, too.

DE: Oh, some things.

QUESTION: But what's the power? I mean, --

DE: What's your question?

QUESTION: What's the power that holds the others in so strongly? Why are you alone or in such --

COMMENT: And what does it take to get more people to do that? What kind of external pressures can you bring to bear on that particular group, that particular club, --

DE: Let's ask the question right away which, in effect, I didn't put it this way. This is what I asked myself after I reflected on what Ram Dass said. I should have said this. I asked myself, all right, he's right. I am talking about these people as if they really are different. And I asked myself -- this was just last summer -- is that what I believe? Do I actually believe that these people are entirely different? I admit, now, I sound as though I do feel that. Do I in fact think that entirely different people in the same jobs would have behaved differently? That I can answer quickly. They would have done much the same. Not everybody would have done the same. But, in general terms, it would have gotten done. So in a way you're asking this too. See, you're saying those people inside. Do you think that they are different from us or from most people, or do they have different organization roles?

Different positions? Is it worth asking about them more than it is asking about -- not everybody. I'm not saying everybody is exactly the same here, but most people cross the run in personalities. That's like current hypothesis I'm putting to you. You could disagree. But let me spread this around for just a little bit more before we keep the dialogue going.

QUESTION: I have another question on how's the system of secrecy ... so that people don't come out.

DE: Well, that's just one thing to obey, you see. It's one more order. Being secret is something you do in response to your order as a condition of remaining in the organization. It happens to be a critical element of remaining in the organization.

QUESTION: But why when others leave don't they say more?

DE: Oh, that can be easily answered. Because they expect to go back or they want to stay on as consultants. They don't leave, in that sense.

COMMENT: But any system in which people don't leave has got a problem.

DE: You see, what that means is -- it's not just people in the Army who carry their future fitness reports in front of them

In my mind, somehow, was running a race balancing an egg on an extremely long spoon, somehow. You know, never block your ... Make one mistake and a career is down the drain. In other words, you've got never to offend a single superior desperately, year after year after year. Well, we know the Army, of course, is particularly obedient, particularly heirarchical, is so for the purpose of carrying out particularly brutal and risky occupations in some cases. What this all comes down to, in a way, is the Army is not as peculiar an organization as we are led to think. We are all, most of us, most of the time, are more like being in the Army than we think. Even in -- that's obviously true in Russia, which can be thought of as a big army, or a big factory. Just how democratic are factories, or corporations, or any corporate group? The point here is that people behave less differently from army time servers than we like to think we do, even though we don't wear uniforms that have all the same color. You can't even quite say that, you know, in the age of blue jeans or grey suits. You follow? The mechanisms that are involved, whatever they are, lead to rather comparable behavior, more than people realize. People who think they're free. And in some identifiable sense are more free than being in the Army, more free than being in Russia. But much less free than they think they are. And some of them know it. By the way, I thought one thing, it occurred to me for this group that's worth raising as a possibility is this; in fact, I should ask this, for data. You've read the Cailey thing now. You know of his groupings, of the AR people, the approved

responsible, taking responsibility as the main dimension, and they approve of the Calley trial -- he should have been held accountable. Versus disapprove of the trial because he wasn't responsible, again responsible. Question: How many people found themselves looking at the question to be in the DR category, the disapprove responsible; people who thought that responsibility is the issue, and on that basis Calley should not have been tried because he wasn't really responsible? He wasn't free, he shouldn't be held accountable. How many people would have answered the question that way (Calley should not have been tried) in this group?

COMMENT: I'm not sure.

DE: Okay, how many not sure? Several. Can I see the hands again? How many do feel, though, that they were in the field that Calley should have been tried, whatever his sentence should have been?

COMMENT: Should have been tried or should have been found --

DE: No, just say should have been tried, let's say. It was right to try him. Okay. Now, is this adding up? How many people, then, thought he should not have been tried? And how many didn't know? There are some people who aren't answering. They don't know whether they don't know. Some don't knowers are coming out of the closet. Again, was anybody in the DR

category? Somebody felt he should definitely not have been tried?

COMMENT: I kind of think I feel that way.

DE: Because --

COMMENT: Not that he shouldn't have been responsible, but that he didn't know that he should be responsible. He didn't know how to be responsible.

DE: Well, but that could be regarded as acquitting him. Do you think that the question -- you know that because you know the evidence which came out in the trial. I mean, you couldn't know that before he's put on trial; you don't know what he knows. So, would you say he should not have been tested on that state of mind? He did kill people. That's a fact. Now, are you saying he shouldn't have been indicted for that? You could conclude that -- knowing what you learned as a result of his state of mind you conclude that he wasn't really fully culpable. But would you go so far as to say that you don't think he should -- it's so self-evident that he was not responsible that he shouldn't even have been tried with testimony and no accusers should have been brought against him. Do you? I mean, I don't want to totally browbeat you, but is that what you do feel?

COMMENT: I keep thinking that he's amoral.

DE: But, again, did you know that before he was indicted? Or before he was tried?

COMMENT: Well, I would think that anybody that did what he did would have to be.

DE: Anybody would have to be. So no one who did that should be tried. Okay, here's what I'm leading to. It just occurred to me why this is so important. I assumed that was the case. Most of us are either don't know, if you like, or in the AR category. There is something that Kelman didn't draw as much attention to as he should have. The AR people misunderstood -- most of them mispredicted the responsibilities of the rest of the society. They thought everybody would be AR, and they were wrong about that. And they thought that -- and they did not realize that they were not only the whole society, they didn't realize they were a minority.

COMMENT: I think the data on that was 42 to 37. I don't think they mispredicted. Now I may be wrong. If somebody has that article we ought to check it. The majority of them thought that others would act, but there was some awareness, ... significant amount that other people did not I think we ought to check that.

DE: All right. We'll check it. The other side, the other

point was that Milgram suggests quite strongly that AR people who are people who also almost all said I would not have done it -- how many people here, in this room, believe that if you were in the position of, say, Sargeant Neblow (sp?), if you were a subordinate to ^{My Lai} ~~My Lai~~ Calley, how many people here believe you would have carried out his orders to shoot the babies? No, how many in this room feel that?

COMMENT: That's the question that constantly comes up when you read Milgram. You go through and you think, well just put me in the experiment and I wouldn't do it. But the _____ part of it is, of course we would.

DE: But the import is this. First of all, to realize the people in this room, then, are in a minority of the American population, first, because 51% of all the people answered believe they personally would have done the same thing. And so we're in a minority if we say we wouldn't have done it. Now, a minority did say they wouldn't have done it, a third, roughly a third, said they would not have. What should we learn, as we discussed last time, from Milgram and from various other data? I think that is an underestimate of the number of people who would have done it. There are -- let's put it in this room, we should guess, at least -- I'd say the question between men and women is not resolved _____ on these questions. Certainly it's reasonable to say -- the data we have on massacres is all by men. I can hardly think of a massacre done by women.

So whether they're capable of it or not we -- but among the men we should guess that some of us would have done that. More than some. I'll tell you why I'm saying this. The reason I raise this up is this: I am not the only one who looks at this data with a somewhat special point of view. I mean, I have my own reasons for having a special relation to the data. It occurred to me that I should maybe bring it up to this group, that it's worth a certain self-awareness here based on this -- new self-awareness based on this data. We should look skeptically or put in brackets our own guesses as to how other people think, because we should perceive ourselves because there are two or more ways at looking at a lot of these phenomena, two rather sharply defined ways. And we should perceive that we are in a minority and a minority that tends not to perceive the rest of the society quite clearly. That's a general thought that occurred to me.

COMMENT: ... refer to a massacre where women were involved ... in Ayacucho last February where they --

DE: Where?

COMMENT: In Ayacucho, Peru, where they slaughtered the six reporters that went up to investigate human rights up there. And they were killed, and the pictures indicate that they were killed with knives by primarily women who were sort of _____ into a state of _____ by the military because you must

kill anyone who comes up here on foot. So that they did that, in a very ritualistic way. They cut their eyes out so that they couldn't, they cut their feet off, ...

DE: And these were civilians that they killed? These weren't soldiers?

COMMENT: They were reporters. They were Peruvian reporters of all ..., mostly leftist, but -- there's an article in the New York Times magazine --

DE: I'd like to hear. That's an interesting example -- I don't think of many other examples. But I'll tell you, one thing -- infanticide is alleged to be done largely by women.

COMMENT: Yeah, in the German camps, I'm sure the women were ...

COMMENT: I think it's taken this long for me to clarify the tension I was feeling and I tried to address it about an hour ago is we have personal process here as it's going the message is, if I were in that situation, if we were all in that situation we might or are very likely to have done the same thing. There's a part of me that's resisting that, and fighting you and fighting your message and saying, "The hell with you I would do that." And so -- I think that's good. I think that's good learning and education for me to struggle with that right now. I'll sit with that for a minute. But there is part of me


that's resisting saying that I'm like that, or that my wife's like that, or other people I know in this room are like that, although John said he didn't know. Okay, so maybe I'm naive like the ARs who think everybody would resist. I feel determined to resist. But there is an issue, which maybe we ought to look at, and that is, wait, who is willing after the secrecy system? That is, there is around the government of secrecy, you know, this damning information and all this brutal -- I mean, they've I mean, I know I couldn't answer that call, ever.

DE: Okay, let me give you a statistic. Do you know -- what's your guess. No, it's interesting. It's important. I've described the implications in the secrecy system to you, and it's especially its implications -- I didn't go into it -- for a democracy, which might be obvious. How many people would you guess had top secret clearances, top secret clearances?

COMMENT: In this society or in the government?

DE: In this society. Currently. I don't say currently, I don't know currently. But the statistic was done -- actually, Nixon had that investigated after the Pentagon Papers came out. So it came out in the hearings as a result of the trial. How many would you guess had top secret clearances?

COMMENT: Twenty percent.

 COMMENT: 90,000.

DE: 90,000. That's a lot. How many more? Anybody less than that? Anybody more than that?

COMMENT: ... less than that.

COMMENT: You would think less than that?

COMMENT: Than 90,000? Oh, ...

DE: Top secret security.

COMMENT: You mean the highest levels?

DE: Well, you see, the highest official --

COMMENT: 90,000, yeah, I think that's obvious.

DE: Now, 90,000 is a lot of people, right? These peculiar guys who entered the secrecy system, men and women, that's these peculiar people who entered -- it's a lot of people, at the same time it's a small proportion. Anybody think it's more than that?

COMMENT: Yeah.

DE: What would you guess?

COMMENT: 250,000, 300,000.

GO DE: Ten million.

COMMENT: university people?

COMMENT: Oh, absolutely, absolutely.

COMMENT: Anybody who gets government money.

DE: I'm not talking about ten million are in families, ten million people have families who, you know, most of them. In other words, if you're saying there's families, there are ten million families, in effect, who have one or more members who have a top secret clearance, which means a member who can't tell the other members what he or she does during the day, what he thinks, why he or she thinks something, what is important, what the nature of their work is, in various aspects. Hmmm. Is that something to think about? That means that -- there's two ways to think about that. One is that there is a society, secret society, in effect, a society of secrecy, a community of secrecy within our larger, and it's not a small set. It's a very large community, extremely large. And it is that compartment of this I've just described. When people gave guesses,

somebody said 250,000. Now I once found a real secret just by chance, which I I believe in putting these things out. This is a real secret. I mean very few people in the Pentagon knew. I happened to be down in a subbasement of the Pentagon once in a very -- door after door after door, in a very secret compartment, having to do with one of these special clearances. And I was waiting for a document of some kind and I looked down at the computer readout that was in front of me and realized that what I was looking at was a list of who had what clearances in the Pentagon. I was able to see who had more clearances than I did. This document was fantastic, which does not mean to say that it had all the clearances on it. For what it did have, it was an amazing document. But it also had a summary page. I think I'm one of the very few people who ever saw a summary of how many existed of certain kinds of special clearances. Now, nobody who has only a top secret clearance knows, and they really don't know, that there are other clearances. In that sense the top secret is almost a cover system. It's meant to keep people who are in the government in a big level from realizing -- they're told so often that now you've got it, top secret, now you know everything, you see everything, so you stop looking. You don't question. It's a way of keeping you from wondering whether there are other clearances. The next higher clearance -- I said I had twelve that were basically higher -- the next higher clearance above top secret is for communications intelligence. And I'm telling you that there were -- all of us that had that clearance at Rand would get together and study the

latest word on communications intelligence, overhearing and staffing. We had to go to a special facility to do this. There were only about five out of five hundred people at Rand. They all had top secret clearances, but five people had this -- it varied from time to time, up to ten, maybe, who had this, what's called, SI clearance. SI means Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is a vague word to cover so ~~know~~^{no} one who ever hears you say special intelligence will realize what it is. It's communications intelligence.

COMMENT: You're selected for this like a secret club. They just tap you on the shoulder and --

DE: Yeah. Five people out of the 500 at Rand, all of whom professionals who had top secret clearance, had this. If you've heard the name J Wohlsteder (sp?), if you've heard Herman Kahn. They not only did not have this clearance, they were not aware there was such a clearance or such data. And they were my best friends. In other words, I'm saying, this was well kept secret. Now, I learned from this list how many people had that clearance: 400,000 people at that time. Wait, I'm sorry. Now that gets into the operational clearances. That's right. I just backed up my memory.

COMMENT: These are, of course, mostly people who would cross administrations and go on and on.

DE: Yeah, right. Now, to understand what we're talking about when I say the ten million, you have to understand a lot of these people are in the military, but a lot -- this may surprise you -- a lot are in industry. Who are making this stuff. John Shushart (sp?), you know, is pouring blood on designs, there is secret. What was the classification in this design Was there a stamp on it? They'd have a big stamp on them. They may not have been classified. The point is that all those people would have clearances, for sure, whether those documents were cleared or not. The point is, these are very large communities of people living in secret governments, essentially. It's another country. It's the country of secrecy. And to keep those secrets -- now I'll tell you one other thing about the SI that will give you the flavor of the whole, to a large extent. What can it mean to say that that clearance is secret? It has to mean that if you were asked, "Do you know of such a clearance or do you have it," you have to say no, or I don't know, or I haven't heard. In other words, you have to lie. The promise to keep secrets is a promise to lie. And since it's not hard to rationalize in a world of super power rivalry and nuclear weapons why there have to be some secrets, one understands that one learns that a very systematic commitment by an American citizen to lie is something you may have to do. It's right. It's not a lesser evil, it's right, required, it's patriotic

duty. And there are many aspects in secrecy. I'll mention just one other. When you realize how well some of these secrets can be kept, when you realize the nature of the system, you realize that no matter how high you are, how expert you are in a certain area, the next guy to you or the President or the next guy over you may well know critical things that you don't know. And the fact that he looks dumb or that he doesn't seem to know anything about this stuff is not proof that he doesn't know. Which means that if you accept the principle, the basic, sort of ethical principle of pragmatism, sort of, of systems analysis, the religion of systems analysis, that whether something is the right thing to do depends on circumstances and depends on alternatives, and depends on the nature, you know, what the problems are, the risks, nothing is absolutely forbidden. Anything might be the best thing to do given the alternatives and the pressures. If that's the case, then if the President orders you to do something that, as far as you know, is catastrophic, or evil, or immoral, or criminal, or wrongheaded, or something, you also know that the circumstances may be different from what you know, and if anybody knows it the President does. The President may have reasons for doing X that would justify it, would satisfy you if you knew them. Whatever he's asking you to do. You can't be confident, 100% confident, that the President has no justification for doing what he's doing. So the vulgar attitude in the street, the President, you know, must have a good reason for doing something, has its counterpart in the very highest levels of our society in the government, who know the President

can be wrong. They don't assume that he must be doing the right thing. On the contrary, they make and break Presidents all the time. You know, they're all asses, and they don't have all that much -- but they know he might be doing the right thing even if what he's calling you to do is blowing up the northern hemisphere, let alone depose ... Commander in Chief of this state made that country Knowing that there is a secrecy system and that the President can know things you don't know means that even very arrogant, sophisticated, highly educated elite people can bend themselves to the President's knee knowing that, how do I know, he may have a good reason for doing this. Of course, you know that he may not, but one psychological -- when it comes to resisting the President, you have to feel you know what you're doing. You have to feel awfully confident that the President is wrong about this.

COMMENT: The consequence of that is you have to know when something's right or wrong.

COMMENT: What if you don't know, if you're unsure?

DE: If you don't know that, you don't resist the President.

COMMENT: What if you resist and you're uncertain? That is the question. That is exactly the question. How do you resist when you're uncertain?

DE: When you're really uncertain, you mean you really don't know? Well, first, not many people resist, to start with.

COMMENT: And not many people are certain. You're saying the only way you can resist the President is to be damn sure that you're right and he's wrong. Now, the chances of that happening are small, frankly. I think that there's a sizeable chance that you will feel some uncertainty.

DE: And the chance that people resist is very small. In fact, they don't do it. So what's

COMMENT: You stood up to the President.

DE: Ahhhh. But there were very special circumstances, and one of those was, you see, if you want to know -- it's a longer story, but at this stage --

COMMENT: That's where we're at.

DE: Oh, no, if you really want -- well, let's get to that. I don't know if I should just launch on this. See, I was going to say -- I could give one rather quick answer, which is this. And it answers several questions that were raised earlier. Anybody who works in the government from time to time gets a quite adequate feeling that this particular President is off base, you know. You know you may be wrong, but you feel confident. How-

ever, to resist that President once means that you will never work for any President again. You cannot disobey just one President and be hired by another one. When I gave Bobby Kennedy a top secret document, I thought of him not as an ordinary senator. He was about to run for President. So I was still thinking of myself as working within the Executive branch. I wouldn't have given it in that stage of my evolution to a mere senator. But Bobby Kennedy was on the verge of -- he was, first, even the brother of a President, former Attorney General -- an executive man himself, in other words -- who had the clearances and run this system, and he was a possible candidate for the next President. So in that sense I gave him some top secret documents which were very significant. That was my first leak in 1968. I had never thought of doing it before, and I did it, if you want to know, because somebody else had just leaked something which impressed me with how powerful and obligatory that was. So it was a total change of consciousness for me to give him this document. When I gave him that document, for which he was very grateful, I knew that that meant I had no future in his administration. He would not hire a man who would give him that document. He would hire me -- that's not entirely true. He would be grateful to me. He might hire me for HEW, you know, or some place or some kind of position -- and this, by the way, was not because -- he, I think, understood me fairly well. I saw a lot of him at that point, actually. I'm not saying that he judged me as an unreliable person. Quite the contrary. I think he admired me a lot. He knew I was doing it

because I thought it was the right thing to do at that time. That's not who anybody hires at that level. You don't hire somebody whose ideals are such that -- I would do it to somebody else, that I would take enough responsibility, I would give it to somebody else. So the implication there is, you have to be willing to give up -- if you're going to be exposed. Of course, leaking is one thing, if nobody knows who's doing it. You can do that. People do do that. But you ask, why don't they tell what they know, you know, when they leave, and so forth. It means they don't get back again into the White House. Now, people, then, are not merely being careerist if influencing the President by direct influence is one of the best things you can possibly do for your country, not just for your self esteem. It's the power ..., it's where it really moves them instead of just playing around, masturbating, as they say. Do it. Don't just feel good, change the President's policy. For that you have to get into the room with him, or he has to read your paper, or something like that. That means that if you go too far against this President, you'll never again have a chance to use your ideals, your knowledge, or whatever, for a later President, or somebody like that. Now that applies very strongly to everybody. And of course it has a careerist aspect. It has an egotist aspect. You want to be the President's advisor. Why didn't Paul Doty, here at Harvard, never come out against anything having to do with the Vietnam war? Because Henry Kissinger answered his phone calls. This is a quote given to me by someone close to Doty, which I can well believe. You know, very natural

attitude. You want to feel that this guy wants -- but also, put in the most idealistic sense, you will be destroying, amputating your ability to use your best instincts, your best, you know, and so forth. So for the good of humanity --

COMMENT: So don't masturbate, castrate yourself.

DE: Well, that's what you'd be doing if you -- that's what they say, by the way, you'd be doing. You know, to give the analogy, I remember once -- I'd actually given the Pentagon Papers at that point, but it wasn't known, so I was still keeping my ties open. Well, I found myself in an advisory position to AID on a panel on Vietnam, high level advising on And I brought up the question very strongly at this point -- no, I take it back. It was advising a private research organization, but there was an AID representative. It was during the war, of course. And so I and some others raised the question, who exactly is funding this project? And finally it turned out that the AID -- not CIA, but AID got all this funding.

COMMENT: What's AID?

DE: Agency for International Development. So I -- oh, well, then, goodbye, I'm reading this thing. That was at first perplexing. It's a research project, you know, perfectly good research project. Who's going to get this? Who's setting the terms for this research? AID is getting all the money? At any

rate, I gave an argument, finally, why what seemed very perplexing to them just made sense to me. Oh, well, this is the war, I am no longer -- I guess I had left Rand at that point. I was

post
line?

— help you decide which policy in Vietnam -- I remember what I said. I said, "I have only one thing to say to you in AID, and that is get out of Vietnam, end the involvement in Vietnam, I have no interest in telling you how to do it better in Vietnam, and I don't think the others should do it either." Okay. That was the thinking behind it. And I remember the anguish in the AID's who knew of me, he'd never met me before. He'd known of me for a long time. And with real anguish he said, "Dan, don't do this. Don't cut yourself off. Don't cut yourself off." And I said, "I'm not cutting myself off. There is life outside the Executive Branch." He said, "Don't destroy yourself. Don't cut yourself off." And as I said, thinking back on it later, I thought -- I've often thought that one of the greatest acts of courage that I've -- physical courage -- that I've ever imagined is the first guy -- some of you will remember, some will not -- who stepped out of a satellite, opened the door, 13,000 miles a minute or hour, what is it they go around an hour? -- and he steps out into the blackness. You know, just steps out, having been told in a book that it was all right, you know, he could get back, and he wouldn't spin out like that, or anything. Think of that. I realized, that is the way people think when they do something that cuts themselves off from the Executive Branch, where the secrets are, where the power are, where the prestige is, and everything. They think of it as

without an umbilical cord stepping out into blackness, chaotic, empty space. And that it's a horror, an awe of doing that, and doing it forever. I mean, you have to understand, you don't have to shoot at a President to do that. All you have to do is to expose what one given President did.

COMMENT: The system, then, propagates secrecy. It's much more than plain obedience to your superior. Some people within that secrecy system might feel that they're doing a very highly moral thing.

DE: They virtually all do. They all do. With a very few exceptions. The person who thinks of himself as a pure careerist is very, very exceptional, and very rarely the person comes into the system like that. It's somebody who's terribly disillusioned. I knew somebody who knew the score -- a couple people -- who knew the score on Vietnam who said -- totally, real experts, and who were willing to say to me, "Dan, I go home at 5 o'clock every day, I leave this place, I shut my safe, I go home and play with my kids, and I ... for my retirement, and I'm not going to quit, and I'm not going to expose it. I'm just going to go through the motions." But that's a very demoralized -- expressing Vietnam. This guy, it turns out, is still in the government. Interesting because he was peculiarly well informed on the whole situation in intelligence with the State Department. Anyway, that's rare, is what I'm saying. People don't tell -- what they do tell themselves is this. Before you leave, I've

got to give you one -- but the material I gave you here, let me explain what that is. We don't really even have to go through it too much. Let me tell you what it is.

Let's settle this question. I take it that what I felt an obligation to lay on you is not what you need to hear, and it's as follows: I've been feeling an obligation to put out a lecture of the kind that I do all the time, which is kind of boring to me, and some of you would know it and some of you would not, on what the roots of our nuclear policy are and where that's going. But I have a feeling that's not what you need to hear or want to hear, that you're ready -- the only reason for doing that, I should say, is to give a sense of relevancy to the moment, on the one hand, to the arms race and what's happening. And second, to communicate what you may accept at this point, and that is that the obedience phenomena we're talking about is put at the service currently of social projects of the most extreme and urgent danger. I did want to make sure that we all understood that's why I'm here, and that's what we're talking about in this course. That we're talking about phenomena, which is beginning to be defined as having to do with obedience, to a large extent, and the reasons for it, which we haven't gone into to -- which has -- we're not talking about it on the city level. But we are talking about obedience that threatens to destroy all life on earth very quickly. Now, if that's sufficiently understood, I maybe don't have to go into the process of the nuclear arms race. Is that right? Does anybody disagree? You could just read the papers. Let me find out the struggles. Who feels they

do need, early on, to hear that? Okay. So it's enough -- so I don't need -- it's in the papers, but does the class, is there access to those papers?

Okay, I don't see many people then. I could talk to you afterwards. I could even give you some of them. You don't need that, right?

Okay. What then -- the next question other than that -- I've now defined enough of the social phenomena, perhaps several times over. Partly because I talked about the torture and massacre, and partly because I don't usually talk about that, I talk about the nuclear all the time. I wanted to lay out a broader menu of evils. But now that we have that and have, perhaps, some agreement that obedience is one of the dimensions of this related, how about the notion next time -- there are two big questions that are raised: How do people disobey and why do they disobey. I would suggest putting that one off until we have discussed, maybe next time -- and this is going to be a lot of conjecture -- why do people obey? Why the phenomenon? If we accept the phenomenon described -- the point of Milgram and Kelman is not much to explain why people act as they do. It's merely to suggest the ubiquity of the phenomenon of extreme obedience.

Another question, then, would be: Why do we think -- I'm not insisting on this sequence -- but one question is: Why do we think people do obey? There's a lot to be said on that which I personally haven't said, and you'll have a lot to say on it. Another question is: Why do people disobey, or how can they be

brought to disobey in ways that must happen? I don't have that up here, but -- Now, I suggested the second -- you may be more interested in that latter part. And I don't feel strongly. It seems to me a little more logical to explore a little more why the more ubiquitous phenomenon occurs, why we think it occurs, what has to be changed to change it, what it's related to. That would be why do people obey as much as they do?

COMMENT: I guess we need a working formulation.

DE: How many would like to hear that the subject of the next session? Okay. Let me see hands, let's count, and I'll just end it there.

COMMENT: I have a feeling that no matter what we plan, it's going to be hard to do one without doing the other somewhat conjointly.

DE: Well, I don't think so. What I would have in mind,

The other one is: Who would like to go right to the question of why do those who disobey -- okay, I'll ask it. Why do those who disobey disobey? Why and when? Would you like to hear that next time?

Actually, to make it not so -- how many hands on that? Okay, we could really do one on each. I will propose to address this question of why they obey the first session. I'll tell you right now, the disobedience I more and more think of as mysteri-

ous, as hard to -- there's a lot of interesting and non-obvious pretty plausible things to say about obedience that are really interesting. I've gotten some of them here, and they're not obvious, even to you people, who I'm sure you'll all come up with stuff on that. My impression more and more is that quick answers as to why people disobey, including myself and others, are hard to come by. It's a subtler phenomenon. And, of course, what we're saying is, much ^{less} ~~less~~ common phenomenon than we had imagined. So that's why I'd like to put it off for a little bit.

COMMENT: At some point -- I'm still quite interested in this -- is there a way to use peoples' proclivity for obedience in ways to -- I mean, maybe that's what disobedience is, it's obedience to a different kind of authority. I mean, this came out before about religious authority, but in the practical sense the thing is how time is going on. How can you use these things, that's what it means.

DE: Okay, listen. That suggests to me, I think, a more fruitful approach than the mere question, why do people who disobey disobey? Let me suggest this, that we'll address first -- and this will get us right quicker into the question of what we can do -- the first session we'll spend a session on what contributes to the phenomena of obedience? Why is it so surprisingly, if I can say it's surprising -- why is it so surprisingly strong and ubiquitous? And the next one is: What could change that? Just

address right way, not why do people disobey? Not many do, it turns out. But how might we bring it about that a lot of people disobey in useful ways, okay? That is related very closely to the question of what can we do? How can we change the risks, because surely a large part of what we will want to do addresses that question, is to get people to be more independent in their judgements and in their actions, to listen to that aspect of their conscience which doesn't simply tell them "obey authority."